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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, a corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, DONALD HACKING, W. R.
McENTIRE, and OSCAR W. CARLSON, the members thereof; DESERET LIVE STOCK COMPANYt a
corporation; IRA P. SHARP, doing
business as Sharp Livestock Company;
JOSEPH H. FRANCIS; J. C. STAUFFER; W. L. HATCH; BOUNTIFUL
LIVE STOCK COMPANY, a corporation; MAX L. COWAN, and COWAN
BROTHERS, a partnership.
Defendants.

Case
No. 7219

BRIEF OF PETITIONER
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
This is a proceeding in certiorari pur~uant to the provisions of 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, for review
of an order of the Public Service Commission of Utah. For
convenience the Public Service Commission of Utah will
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sometimes hereafter be referred to as P.S.C.U. or as the
Commission. The petitioner, Union Pacific Railroad Company, will sometimes hereafter be referred to as the railroad
or the railroad company.
Procedurally, this case originated when the P.S.C.U.,
on its own motion, set for hearing informal complaints concerning the stock loading facilities of the railroad company
at Wahsatch, Utah. Pursuant to notice, such hearing was
commenced on the 18th day of August, 1947 before the
P.S.C.U. at the State Capitol (Tr. 5) with several interested
parties appearing. At that time it became apparent to the
Commission that the party really interested in this matter
as the adversary of the railroad company was Deseret Live
Stock Company, a corporation engaged in fairly substantial
livestock operations in Utah (Tr. 16 through 23). Thereupon the P. S. C. U. continued the hearing and required
Deseret Live Stock Company to file a formal application
showing what relief was sought in this proceeding by Deseret Live Stock Company (Tr. 23, 25, 26). In accordance
with these instructions issued by the Commission, Deseret
Live Stock Company, which will for convenience sometimes
hereafter be referred to as the livestock company, filed a
written petition seeking an order of the P.S.C.U. requiring
the railroad company to construct a complete stock loading
unit, including pens and trackage, on the north side of the
railroad company's tracks between Wahsatch, Utah and
the Wyoming state line.
Upon such petition the matter was then heard by the
Commission commencing on the 25th day of August, 1947.
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After hearing a great deal of testimony and receiving numerous exhibits, the Commission took the matter under advisement and on the lOth day of May, 1948 entered its order
requiring the Union Pacific Railroad Company to construct
certain stock loading facilities at a certain location near
Wahsatch, Utah. The expense of constructing these facilities would be approximately $25,000.00 on present construction prices.
On June 1, 1948, within the time allowed by law, the
railroad company filed with the Commission its petition for
rehearing. This petition was denied by the Commission
on July 14, 1948 and the railroad company, petitioner in
these certiorari proceedings, perfected said certiorari proceedings. At the hearing commenced by the Commission on
August 25, 1947 numerous parties appeared before the
Commission and some pleadings were filed by other business
organizations than the Deseret Live Stock Company, so
that the defendants named above in the title of this proceeding, all of whom apparently had an interest in this
matter, were joined as defendants along with the P.S.C.U.
and the Deseret Live Stock Company in this certiorari proceeding.
STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is, and for many
years has been, a common carrier of freight and passengers
by rail, engaged in interstate commerce. As a part of its
system it maintains a double main line track between eastern points and western points, which said double track in the
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vicinity of Wahsatch, Utah runs approximately east and
west. The southerly track of these two tracks handles eastbound trains and the northerly track handles westbound
trains (Ex. 10, Tr. 40).
For approximately forty years the Union Pacific has
maintained certain stock loading facilities at Wahsatch,
Utah, which are located on the south side of these double
tracks. These stock loading facilities, consisting of pens,
loading chutes and suitable trackage for the storage of
empty cars, are adequate in size to accommodate all business which is presently handled by the railroad company at
Wahsatch, Utah, except in exceptional emergencies where
all shippers in that area desire to use the loading facilities at
the same time. Mr. Dansie, manager of the Deseret Live
Stock Company and its principal witness, stated that his company could use about four more pens in the present facilities
(Tr. 92); but he admitted that the present facilities, as to
size at least, were adequate in normal situations (Tr. 104).
In substantiation of this fact the railroad company
showed by its records of all shipments from Wahsatch,
either in or out, that the loading facilities now in existence
there are used to less than five per cent of capacity computed
on a year-round basis. These figures were based on 1946
usage, which was the last full year before the hearing (Tr.
419). The evidence also shows that during 1946 the loading
facilities were actually used upon only 58 separate days.
Considering 58 days as the time of each year during which
the loading facilities are used-still only 28 per cent of the
capacity of the loading facilities a.t Wahsatch, Utah presentSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Iy maintained by the railroad was required for all loading

or unloading of livestock at that spot (Tr. 419). These
figures were computed on shipments of all shippers using
the facilities at Wahsatch, whether in shipments from or
to this particular point. Admittedly these figures are based
upon the assumption that all parties concerned in the loading or unloading of any livestock perform their varied functions efficiently (Tr. 425, 426). Nevertheless, it remains
abundantly clear that with a margin of 72 per cent of unused capacity on the days when the loading yards are used,
reasonable cooperation between the shippers and the railroad company, together with reasonable efficiency, renders
the present facilities absolutely adequate in size to handle
such business as is now transacted by the railroad at Wahsatch, Utah.
Mr. David E. Howard, manager of the Bountiful Live
Stock Company and a witness for Deseret Live Stock Company, suggested that two more loading chutes be installed
in the present facilities, that there be some reconditioning of
these facilities; that a few cinders be dumped in some mudhole, and that some lighter boards be supplied for runway
boards into the cars (Tr. 187, 188). Otherwise, in his opinion,
the stockyards were fully adequate, at least as to size (Tr.
188, 189).
We parenthetically here observe that the railroad company has always been, and still is, willing to make such
minor repairs and alterations as are suggested above or as
may from time to time become necessary for maintaining
the adequacy of the loading facilities.
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It is significant to note that the P. S.C. U. did not find
that the present facilities for loading and unloading stock
at Wahsatch were inadquate in size (Report of Commission);
rather, the Commission after finding dangers in driving
livestock across the track, said in paragraph No. 10 of its
Report: "That for the shippers from the north the present
stock loading facilities of said railroad at Wahsatch, Utah are
not reasonable or adequate." It is therefore clear that the
Commission based its order upon a determination that the
facilities were not adequate because of their location. The
basic complaint of the Deseret Live Stock Company and the
sole basis upon which the P. S. C. U. made the order complained of, is that the present stock loading facilities at
Wahsatch are inadequate in that they require Deseret Live
Stock Company to move its livestock across the tracks either
before loading or after unloading. This problem was the focal
point of most of the evidence adduced; and the evidence concerning the same requires some detail in stating.

The present facilities for stock loading and unloading
at Wahsatch, which have been in existence for about forty
years (Rep. of Com., par. 5), were originally located on the
single main line track of the railroad. Since that time, however, the railroad company has constructed the present
double track main line and the old main line track is now a
spur which is part of the trackage used by the railroad in
servicing the loading facilities at Wahsatch (Rep. of Com.,
par. 5, Ex. 1). These stockyards have been used for many
years by shippers in this area. At the present time all of
these shippers, except Deseret Live Stock Company and the
Francis interests, ship to or from the south side of the tracks
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and the south side of the stockyards so that there is no
necessity for other shippers to trail any livestock across the
, tracks of the railroad company for shipping purposes (Tr.
469). The Francis interests ship very moderate amounts of
livestock (Tr. 467, Ex. 12), which in 1946 consisted in total
of three car-loads. It therefore becomes plainly apparent
that the only problem presented in this case centers around
the operations of the Deseret Live Stock Company. The
livestock company owns large areas of land north of Wahsatch, which constitute its summer range. Some distance
away in Tooele County, Deseret Livestock Company also
owns other land and federal grazing permits, which it uses
as winter range. In the spring of each year the livestock
company ships several thousand sheep and cattle to Wahsatch by rail and in the fall it ships back from Wahsatch
to Tooele County to take advantage of the different grazing seasons, all of this traffic going through the present
loading facilities (Tr. 31, 32, 33). We here call to the court's
attention, however, the statement made by Mr. Dansie that
_ there is no guarantee that such shipments will continue in
the future and that the same may, in the discretion of the
livestock company, be discontinued at any time, without
any notice, if other means of transportation appear more
favorable to the livestock company (Tr. 151). In reality, of
course, this fact needs no testimony from Mr. Dansie or any~ one else for support since it is obvious that any shipper may
at any time decide to use some other means of transportation than railroad for the shipment of its products and its
livestock.
In addition to the above mentioned shipments between
,, winter and summer rangeS, there are also some shipments of
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livestock made by Deseret Live Stock Company to various
markets, which shipments are made from Wahsatch, and
there are also shipments of wool from W ahsatch to various
eastern markets. The shipments of livestock to market
places throughout the nation usually take place in the fall
(Tr. 38), at approximately the same time as the shipments
from the summer range at Wahsatch to the winter range
in Tooele County.
Thus the use of the Wahsatch facilities by the Deseret
Live Stock Company, which seeks to require a very large
expenditure on the part of the railroad company for additional facilities, is clearly confined to a relatively short
percentage of each year.
The present means by which Deseret Live Stock Company reaches the loading facilities now in existence when
shipping from Wahsatch is as follows, - the livestock,
whether sheep are cattle, are trailed to a track crossing about
on~quarter mile east from the present loading facilities;
there the trains are flagged and the livestock are driven
across the tracks. They are then driven west about onequarte'r mile to the present loading equipment. While thus
traveling west on the south side of the tracks the stock is
between the railroad tracks and U. S. Highway 30. U.S.
Highway 30 is roughly parallel to the tracks in this area and
is approximately 200 feet south of the tracks as they now
exist (Ex. 1). When shipping livestock to Wahsatch an
exactly reverse procedure is used in unloading. Deseret
Live Stock Company complains that this crossing, together
with the ne,cessity of driving stock one-quarter of a mile between the tracks and U. S. 30, is so dangerous that it renders
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the whole present facility inadequate. In support of the
proposition Deseret offered evidence that sheep and cattle
were on occasion frightened by trains and tracks, that on
occasion they tended to stampede when near railroad facilities, that loss of weight was sometimes thus caused due to
stampeding, that sometimes sheep ran onto U. S. 30 in
their fright, and that in the opinion of the Deseret's witnesses the lives of their employes and of travelers on the
highway were endangered by this manner of handling what
were claimed to be uncontrollable animals.
We wish at this point to call to the court's attention
the obvious fact that it is impossible to ship living livestock by rail without having said livestock at railroad tracks
where engines and cars must be present; that even if a loading yard and chutes were constructed on the north side of
the track it would still be necessary to have this range stock
near tracks, engines and cars when such livestock were
shipped from Wahsatch or to Wahsatch; and that Deseret
Live Stock Company's witness admitted that even under
the most favorable circumstances there is a tendency of
mivestock to stampede when close to railroad equipment (Tr.
94).
The crossing itself and the stockyards now being used
may best be described by referring the court to the photographs introduced at the hearing and the maps also introduced. Exhibit 2 is a photograph which shows a view
to the north from the crossing of the approach to the crossing which is used in trailing livestock from the north side of
the tracks across the railroad tracks (Tr. 108, 109). Exhibit
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3 is a photograph showing another view of the same location. Exhibit 4 shows the terrain and the road westwardly
from the crossing which is now used in trailing livestock
from the crossing westwardly to the stockyards. U. S.
Highway 30 appears at the left of this photograph (Tr.
110, 113). Exhibit 5 is a photograph taken from a position
a short distance east of the place from which Exhibit 4 was
taken. In Exhibit 5 the camera was facing west and this
photograph shows some of the buildings complained of by
the livestock company as constituting an unusual hazard
(Tr. 111). Exhibit 6 is a photograph taken from a point
still farther east looking west and showing the "metropolis"
which it is claimed is so dangerous in trailing livestock. Exhibit 6 was taken from a point east of the crossing and
south of the same so that by examining Exhibits 4, 5, 6 and
9 (hereinafter referred to) it is possible to visualize every
hazard presented by the terrain in driving the stock westwardly from the crossing to the stock loading facilities (Tr.
114). That this is not a labyrinth 8.Iong which it should be
impossible to trail even range livestock seems too clear to
require further comment. Exhibit 7 is a photograph taken
from approximately the center of the crossing looking westwardly showing the railroad tracks of the Union Pacific
main line; Exhibit 8 is a different view of the approach to
the crossing looking northward from the tracks, and Ex·
hibit 9 shows the station at Wahsatch which is west of the
crossing and east of the stockyards themselves (Tr. 119).
A fair summary of the facts revealed by these pictures
is that the crossing and the terrain where livestock must
move between the tracks and Highway U.S. 30 is relatively
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open country distinctly rural in character; that the crossing
presents no unusual hazards in its approach; that there i~
ample room between the tracks and U.S. 30 to move livestock
west to the stockyards after making the crossing; that the
terrain is reasonably level so far as the path of the livestock
is concerned ; and that the hazard complained of in the way
of building structures consists of a few scattered sheds, small
dwellings, a tank, and a station.
The witnesses for the livestock company in an attempt to
exaggerate the situation there present describe various alleged '
obstacles in the terrain which in their judgment increased the
difficulty of the crossing. For example, Mr. Dansie described
a twenty-foot high embankment allegedly immediately west
of the crossing on the north side of the tracks. This embankment appears clearly in Exhibit 7 but as is also· clear
from Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 8, said embankment does not in..:
terfere with the crossing itself. We call the court's atten•
tion to the fact that the photographs were identified as
fairly descriptive of the situation by the manager of the
Deseret Live Stock Company and we respectfully submit
that said photographs do not fairly allow any other descrip-'
tion of the physical terrain than is set forth above.
As to the layout of the present stock loading facilities
themselves, we refer the court to Exhibit 1 and the testi~
mony concerning the same at pages 133, 134 and 135 of the
Transcript.
The evidence before the Commission also disclosed that
in order for the public to have a practical m€ans of using.
the stockyards ordered by the Commission to be constructed
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on the north side of the tracks, it would be necessary for the
public to cross land of the Deseret Live Stock Company (Tr.
144). Therefore, the Commission required Deseret to give
an easement across its land sufficient for the construction
of the stockyards and also an easement 600 feet in width
running east from the railroad crossing to the proposed
stockyards. This 600 foot easement as ordered by the Commission runs parallel with the tracks and immediately north
of the railroad right of way (Order of the Commission).
Thus the inconsistency of the Commission's order clearly
appears. In effect, the Commission has said by its order
in this cause that in order for the new stockyards to constitute a true public facility it is necessary for the public
to have a right of way over the Deseret lands. The Commission has further said that this use of the new stockyards requires the trailing of livestock along this 600 foot
easement east from the crossing to the proposed stockyards.
It is therefore significant to observe that use of the new
facilities by anyone other than the Deseret Live Stock Company people involves the following movement: "Crossing a
double track and then trailing livestock eastwardly down
a corridor of land to loading facilities." At most, any distinction between this proposed facility as it would be furnished to the general public and the present facility as furnished to the Deseret Live Stock Company is one of very
slight degree.
It is also petitioner's contention that the evidence discloses the following facts which will be of consequence in
the argument herein contained. The evidence thereon will
be discussed at appropriate places in the argument.
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1. The present crossing over the tracks is a
private crossing and not a public crossing.
2. The railroad has adopted a policy which has
governed its conduct for many years, pursuant to
what is known as General Order 15, of requiring all
shippers to pay for all trackage and facilities off the
railroad right of way which are private in nature.
This is important if it be determined that the new
stockyards will in fact be a private facility, because
in such event compliance with the order of the
P.S.C.U. will constitute the giving of a preference
to Deseret Live Stock Company in absolute violation of the Interstate Commerce Act.
3. There is absolutely no evidence in the record made before the Commission as to the minimum
requirements of the shippers from the north of the
tracks in the way of loading facilities; and certainly
there is no evidence that the facilities shown in Exhibit 10, which were ordered constructed by the Commission, constitute the minimum requirements for
reasonable facilities on the north side of the tracks
at Wahsatch, Utah.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in finding that the present stock
loading facilities are not reasonable or adequate.
2. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in making the order requiring the
railroad company to construct the new facilities
therein mentioned, in that compliance with the same /
by the railroad company will require the raiTroad
company to violate the Interstate Commerce Act, and
consequently, said order of the P.S.C.U. is unlawful.
3. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in finding that the proposed facilities will be public in nature.
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4. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in requiring the railroad company
to construct said new facilities in that no evidence
in the record supports the conclusion that a program
of the magnitude required by the Commission's order
is necessary for the north side of the tracks and
shippers located thereon at Wahsatch, Utah, to correct any alleged inadequacy which may exist, said
alleged inadequacy being specifically denied by petitioner.
5. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in issuing its order requiring the
construction of additional loading facilities without
making sufficient findings relative to the facts relied
on in support thereof.
6. The Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in denying the railroad company's petition for rehearing.
ARGU:MENT
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE
PRESENT STOCK LOADING FACILITIES ARE NOT
REASONABLE OR ADEQUATE.

The first contention made by the railroad company as
presented by the first assignment of error above is that the
Commission acted arbitrarily and unlawfully and erred in
finding the present stockyards inadequate and unreasonable.
We state at the outset that the jurisdiction of the Commission to enter any order on the subject of increased facilities
must be grounded on the provisions of 76-4-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943. This section provides as follows:
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"76-4-7. Rules, Equipment, Service - Regulation
After Hearing.
Whenever the commission shall find, after a
hearing, that the rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances, facilities, or service of any public
utility, or the methods of manufacture, distribution,
transmission, storage or supply employed by it, are
unjust, unreasonable, unsafe, improper, inadequate
or insufficient, the commission shall determine the
just, reasonable, safe, proper, adequate or sufficient
rules, regulations, practices, equipment, appliances,
facilities, service or methods to be observed, furnished, constructed, enforced or employed, and shall
fix the same by its order, rule or regulation. The
commission, after a hearing, shall prescribe rules
and regulations for the performance of any service
or the furnishing of any commodity of the character
furnished or supplied by any public utility, and on
proper demand and tender of rates such public utility
shall furnish such commodity or render such service
within the time and upon the conditions provided in
such rules."
No other statute which we are able to discover would
warrant any action by the Commission of the character such
as the order complained of in these proceedings. Apparently
in realization of this fact the Commission found that the
present facilities of the railroad company at Wahsatch were
inadequate and unreasonable. (Report of Commission, par.
10).
We respectfully urge that if the Commission erred in
making such .finding the whole basis for its order fails and
that the Commission was completely· without jurisdiction to
enter the order made. This must 'be so since the legislature
which created the jurisdiction of the Commission to make
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such orders as the one complained of also provided the
qualifications which justified the same in 76-4-7, Utah
Code Annotated, 1943.

It is apparent from the record made before the Commission as pointed out in the foregoing statement of facts
and also from the findings of the Commission as contained
in its report, that the sole factor in the present stock loading
facilities which can even be argued as inadequate or unreasonable is their location. Every stock loading facility
has to be built on one side of the tracks or the other and
the :record shows that as to shippers from the south of the
tracks the present location is advantageous. Certainly from
the evidence produced at the hearing it cannot be said that
the choice of the south side of the tracks for the present
stock loading facilities by the railroad was an unreasonable
one since the majority of the shippers, with nearly one-half
the transportation business, are located on that side of the
track. Therefore, the problem resolves itself into a determination as to whetheT or not the present stockyards are inadequate or unreasonable merely because the location of
the same requires shippers from the north side of the tracks
to trail their livestock across the tracks.
The Union Pacific Railroad Company is a common
carrier of livestock. As such we concede that it has a duty
to the public to furnish reasonably adequate loading and
unloading facilities at Wahsatch, Utah with reasonable
means of ingress and egress; but the railroad is in the
transportation business and the duty to furnish reasonable
and adequate facilities extends only so far as transporta·
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tion is concerned. In the case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Rail·wa.y Co., et al. v. United States, et al., 295 U. S. 193,
55 Sup. Ct. 748, 79 L. Ed. 1382, suit was brought by several
railroad carriers against the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission to enjoin enforcement of an
order of the I.C.C. A three judge district court dismissed
the suit and appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the
United States. By a complaint before the I.C.C. a company
called the Hygrade Company had attacked as unreasonable
and in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act the carrier's
tariff charges applicable to switching livestock to the
packing plant of the Hygrade Company. The complaint before the Commission also assailed yardage charges collected
by a livestock company on livestock delivered at the stockyards. It appeared that the railroad carriers delivered stock
to the stockyards company who then turned the same over
to the Hygrade Company. The railroad charged a small sum
for each car for unloading as part of its tariff and in addition the stockyards company, in accordance with tariffs
filed with the Secretary of Agriculture by it, collected a
charge on all livestock received in the yards. The complaint
of the Hygrade Company was to the effect that it being a
part of the duty of a common carrier to provide reasonable
unloading facilities no charges should have been made other
than the charges for transportation. The Commission found
in favor of t!1e Hyrade Company. In passing upon this proposition the Supreme Court of the United States made the
following observations:
"Transportation of ordinary live stock in carload lots from and to points other than public stockSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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yards has always been deemed to include furnishing of facilities at the place of shipment for loading
and at destination for unloading and suitable ways
for convenient ingress and egress."
However, it appeared in this case that part of the service
rendered by the stockyards company was the furnishing of
a special route from the stockyards company to the plant
of the Hygrade Company. In passing upon this matter it
therefore became important to determine whether or not
a special means of ingress or egress was an additional service furnished by the carrier or by the stockyards company
of such a nature as to entitle the carrier or the stockyards
company to make an extra charge therefor, and in determining this issue the Supreme Court of the United States said:
"Plainly there is an essential difference between
the route from unloading pens to consignee's plant
and a mere way out to the public highways. Transportation does not include delivery within the Hy.grade plant or the furnishing of the properties, overhead runway and all, that are used for that purpose.
Usage and physical conditions combined definitely
to end transportation, at least in respect of these
shipments, with unloading into suitable pens as is
now required by Section 15 (5). (Interstate Commerce Act.) "
This case represents a square ~olding by the Supreme
Court of the United States that the duty of the carrier to
furnish reasonable loading and unloading facilities ends
when the carrier has furnished suitable chutes and pens
for this process, together with a convenient way for the
shipper to reach a public highway to and from such pens
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and chutes. In other words, the transportation of livestock
ends at the time when the same have been unloaded and
a suitable means of access to a public highway has been
furnished. To require a railroad company to go further and
to provide a means by which the livestock may be moved
from the unloading facilities to the lands of the consignee
goes beyond the duty of transportation imposed upon a railroad carrier. We therefore assert that the facilities, equipment, service or appliances mentioned in 76-4-7, Utah Code
Annotated, 1943, must refer only to such additional facilities, equipment, service or appliances as are concerned in
the transportation of livestock and that the same are in no
way connected with additional facilities not a part of the
transportation. Consequently, the Public Service Commission of Utah may not require additional facilities, equipment, service or appliances in no way connected with the
actual transportation of livestock. Any other rule results
in a practical absurdity. If a carrier provides suitable
loading and unloading facilities and a suitable means of
ingress from and egress to a public highway, it will have
done all that it is possible for a railroad to do as to most
shippers of livestock, for the reason that most shippers do
not own land which abuts a railroad track. For example,
as to an individual owning land upon which livestock was
grazed north of the lands of the Deseret Live Stock Company at Wahsatch, Utah, the railroad company would be
absolutely incapable of providing a direct means of approach
to any stock loading facilities without condemning large
portions of the Deseret Company's lands. Consequently,
the only rational rule, compliance with which can be exSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pected of any common carrier, is that the carrier be required
to furnish adequate stock loading and unloading facilities,
together with a reasonable means of ingress and egress to
a public highway. Certainly that has been done in the
instant case both as to Deseret Live Stock Company and all
other shippers in the Wahsatch area. Indeed, in the instant
case the railroad company has made available facilities
which not only afford reasonable access to a public highway so far as Deseret Live Stock is concerned, but also a
crossing over its tracks with flag protection against trains,
which permits the livestock to be driven directly onto the
property of the livestock company. Under these circumstances, we are unable to comprehend how it can be said
that the railroad company has failed to furnish adequate
and reasonable loading and unloading facilities at Wahsatch, Utah.
Unless this court is prepared to hold that it is the duty
of the railroad company to provide means of ingress to and
egress from its stock loading facilities directly upon the
lands of any and all shippers of livestock, then it cannot
fairly be said that the present ,facilities at Wahsatch, Utah
are inadequate. Although no complaint has been made by
shippers from the south of Wahsatch as to the means of ingress and egress to the present loading yards, nevertheless,
if the reasoning which the Commission adopted in making
the order complained of is sound, then even as to such shippers from the south the present facilities are inadequate.
This is inevitably true because it is impossible for all of these
·shippers to own land immediately adjacent to the present
stock loading facilities at Wahsatch, and it is also unquesSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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tionably the fact that the railroad does not furnish any particular route by which said shippers may trail their livestock either to or from the lands upon which they are grazed
by their owners.
That the scope of the carrier's duty is to supply reasonable facilities for transportation purposes and no other has
heretofore been determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Great Northern Railway Co. v.
State of Minnesota ex rel. State Railroad & Warehouse
Commission, 238 U. S. 340, 35 Sup. Ct. 753, 59 L. Ed. 1337.
In that case the Public Service Commission of the State of
Minnesota had ordered the Great Northern Railway Company to construct a stock scales at a particular point along
its line. The railroad company asserted, as does the railroad company in this case, that such order constituted a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution in that it constituted the taking of the railroad
company's property without due process of law. In passing
upon this proposition the Supreme Court made the following statements:
"Manifestly, if the order is enforced plaintiff
in error's property will be taken. * * * The
business of a railroad is transportation and to supply the public with conveniences not connected therewith is no part of its ordinary duty. The obvious
purpose of the challenged order was to enforce installation at Bertha of a scale like those at Eagle Bend
and Hewitt and dedicated to same use. Under admitted facts, unless justified by alleged unlawful
discrimination, we think this was an arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power. It is no answer to
say, as counsel do, that the Commission has 'general
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authority to require railroad companies to supply the
necessary demands of the public along transportation
lines; that it has a right to require the company to
build and maintain such facilities as are necessary
for the public needs.' The demands upon a carrier
which lawfully may be made are limited by its duty,
and the present record conclusively shows the required structure had no direct relation thereto."
More simply stated, perhaps, our argument in this particular is as follows : The route from the present loading
facilities to Deseret's land is not part of the facilities of the
railroad for the transportation of livestock and is therefore no basis for determining the facilities themselves to
be inadequate or unreasonable.
We submit that in view of the holding of the Great
Northern case cited above, the Commission's order not only
is unlawful because it is contrary to the provisions of 76-4-7,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, but it 3:lso constitutes a violation of the XIV Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We therefore respectfully urge that transportation of
livestock requires of the carrier only that it furnish adequate loading and unloading facilities with reasonable
means of ingress and egress to a public highway as distinguished from a convenient route direct to the lands of
the consignee. The evidence before the Commission absolutely demonstrated that the present facilities do furnish
adequate means for the loading and unloading of such livestock as is handled at Wahsatch, Utah, together with reasonable means of access to said facilities from a public highSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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way. In fact, the evidence of the Deseret Live Stock Company shows that U. S. 30 is so close to the facilities that
sometimes livestock get onto the highway without any
desire therefor upon the part of the herders. These factors
should make it plainly evident that the Commission arbitrarily and unlawfully erred in finding the present facilities
at Wahsatch to be inadequate and unreasonable. But aside
from this proposition, we respectfully urge that the Commission arbitrarily and unlawfully erred in such finding
in that the requirement imposed by law to furnish adequate
facilities does not contemplate duplication of facilities on
both sides of a track in order to avoid inconvenience to
shippers. Neither the federal law nor the state statutes
administered by the Public Service Commission of Utah
may impose upon a common carrier an expenditure in excess of $20,000.00 unless the same constitutes a reasonable
regulation of the carrier's business. To impose such expense upon any other basis is to deprive the carrier of its
property without due process of law in violation of the Utah
Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.
See the Great Northern Railway Co. case, supra.
The uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Phelps, a witness
for the railroad company, shows that there are no rural
shipping facilities for stock on the whole Union Pacific
, system with which he is acquainted where some shippers do
not have to cross a main line track (Tr. 420). If the railroad
must duplicate the present facilities at Wahsatch on the
north side of the tracks, there seems no good reason why
the railroad should not also be required in proper proceedings to duplicate any stock loading facilities on both sides
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Qf its tracks at every rural shipping point throughout its
whole railroad system. We cannot conceive that this is
reasonable. It is as though the residents on the east side of
Main Street in Salt Lake City requested an additional
passenger depot at some east side location because they
disliked the danger of crossing Main Street to reach the
present passenger depot at Third West and South Temple
Streets.
In the case of Central Stockyards Co. v. Louisville &
Nashville Railway Co., 192 U.S. 568, 48 L. Ed. 565, 24 Sup.
Ct. 339, the Supreme Court of the United States was called
upon to consider a somewhat similar problem. In that case
the Louisville & Nashville Railway Company had refused
to receive livestock tendered to it outside the State of
Kentu~ky for delivery to certain stockyards known as the
Central Stockyards. These yards were located on the line
of the Southern Railway Company in Louisville, Kentucky.
The defendant, Louisville & Nashville Railway Company,
maintained a similar stockyard setup known as the Bourbon
Stockyard in Louisville and declined to receive livestock
billed to the Central Stockyards or to deliver livestock
destined to Louisville, Kentucky at any other place than the
Bourbon yards. This refusal was despite the fact that there
were railroad connections between the Louisville & Nashville
Railway Company and the Southern Railway Company so
that it was physically possible to make delivery of livestock at the Central Stockyards without the construction
of any new facilities. The plaintiff claimed the right to
compel delivery of livestock by the defendant railway company at the Central Stockyards under the Interstate Com·
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merce Act of February 4, 1887, Chapter 104, Section 3,
which made it unlawful for common carriers to give unreasonable preferences and required them to afford all
reasonable, proper and equal facilities for the interchange
of traffic between the lines of such carrier and other carriers in interstate commerce. In discussing the right of
the plaintiff to the relief requested the court removed from
its consideration all procedural matters and went on to
discuss the merits of the proposition contended for by the
plaintiff. In holding that the plaintiff was not entitled to
the relief prayed for Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Supreme Court of the United States, said:
"If the cattle are to be unloaded, then, as was said
in Covington Stock-Yards Company v. Keith, the defendant has a right to unload them where its appliances for unloading are and cannot be required to
establish another set hard by."
The court further specifically held that the fact that the
Central Stockyards were public stockyards did not in any
manner affect the case. While we concede that the court in
the Central Stockyards Company case was primarily concerned with the question as to whether the failure of the
defendant railroad to deliver stock at the Central Stockyards constituted an unreasonable preference, we respectfully submit that the reasoning is applicable to the case at
bar. Unless the facilities presently located at Wahsatch,
Utah constitute a discrimination as against the Deseret
Live Stock Company in its shipping, we are unable to perceive how the same can be said to be unreasonable or inadequate.
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In the case of Covington Stock-Yards Co. v. Keith, 139
U.S. 128, 35 L. Ed. 73, 11 Sup. Ct. 461, the Supreme Court
of the United States recognized the duty of a railroad company holding itself out as a common carrier to provide suitable means and facilities for receiving livestock offered
to it for shipment in the following language:
"The railroad company, holding itself out as a
carrier of live stock, was under a legal obligation,
arising out of the nature of its employment, to provide suitable and necessary means and facilities for
receiving live stock offered to it for shipment over
its road and connections, as well as for discharging
such stock after it reaches the place to which it is
consigned. The vital question in respect to such
matters is, whether the means and facilities so furnished by the carrier or by some one in its behalf
are sufficient for the reasonable accommodation of
the public."
The question involved in that case was one of charges for
use of certain stockyards but the court went on to say, at
page 136 of the U. S. Reports, as follows:
"We must not be understood as holding that the
railroad company, in this case, was under any legal
obligation to furnish, or cause to be furnished, suitable and convenient appliances for receiving and
delivering live stock at every point on its line in
the city of Covington where persons engaged in
buying, selling or shipping live stock, chose to estab·
lish stock yards. In respect to the mere loading and
unloading of live stock, it is only required by the
nature of its employment to furnish such facilities
as are reasonably sufficient for the business at that
city."
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In the case of State ex rel. Railroad Com'rs. v. Florida,
East Coast Ry. Co., 68 So. 761, the Supreme Court of Florida
was concerned with the situation where the Railroad Com. missioners of Florida had ordered the defendant railroad
company to perform certain switching operations on side
tracks without charge. The court said at the very outset,
as the basic premise upon which it made the final determination, that the charges could be lawfully collected:
"The railroad company has a right to load or
unload its cars where its facilities or appliances for
such work are, and it would be unreasonable to require it to establish other facilities to accommodate
each patron. (Citing Cases)." * * * "So in Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. State of Nebraska, 217
U. S. 196, 30 Sup. Ct. 461, 54 L. Ed. 727, it was held
that the carrier could not be required to build more
private connections because the obligation was not
involved in the carrier's public duty, and the requirement went beyond the reasonableness of the state's
protective power."
In conclusion we submit that the finding of the Com-mission that the present facilities are inadequate is erroneous, arbitrary and unlawful for the following reasons:
1. That the law does not impose upon the carrier the
duty to furnish facilities for loading or unloading of livestock which include a direct and convenient route to the
lands of the consignee or of the shipper, but only requires
the furnishing of reasonable facilities with access to a
public highway.
2. That it is unreasonable to find that the present
facilities are inadequate when the only complaint which
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may fairly be made with reference to the same is that it
would be more convenient for the Deseret Live Stock Company to have an additional facility on the other side of the
tracks.
THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN MAKING THE ORDER
REQUIRING THE RAILROAD COMPANY TO CONSTRUCT THE NEW F AGILITIES THEREIN MENTIONED, IN THAT COMPLIANCE WITH THE SAME
BY THE RAILROAD COMPANY WILL REQUIRE THE
RAILROAD COMPANY TO VIOLATE THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT AND CONSEQUENTLY, SAID
ORDER OF THE P.S.C.U. IS UNLAWFUL.
The second contention which we wish to urge for the
court's consideration logically raises the matters presented
by our assignments of error 2 and 3. In support of this argument we now assert to the court that the new facilities required by the Commission will not be public in nature but
will instead be private. We have heretofore, in the statement
of facts contained in this brief, discussed some of the evidence relative to this matter but it now appears necessary
to call to the court's attention certain other portions of the
evidence dealing with this particular problem. As hereto·
fore pointed out, the new facilities will be available to
shippers from the south side of the tracks only if said ship·
pers follow a route across the main line double track of the
Union Pacific Railroad and thence eastwardly along a
corridor of land 600 feet wide to the new stockyards. In
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view of the fact that the shippers from the south concede
the present facilities on the south side of the tracks to be
adequate for their needs, as shown by the evidence, it is a
practical absurdity to suppose that these shippers will ever
use the new loading and unloading pens if the same are constructed pursuant to the Commission's order. There is no
reason to expect any shipper from the south to undertake
what we concede is an inconvenience of crossing the double
main line tracks. Consequently, common sense requires the
conclusion that the only shippers who ever will use the
facilities to be constructed pursuant to the Commission's
order will be shippers from the north side of the tracks.
Under present conditions there are only two business entities using the railroad facilities who ship either to or from
the north side of the track. These shippers are Deseret
Live Stock Company and the Francis interests. As was
heretofore pointed out, the Francis interests shipped three
carloads of livestock in 1946, the last full year before the
hearing conducted by the Commission, and consequently,
the last year upon which figures were available. This amount
of transportation business is so relatively insignificant that
for all practical purposes the sole shipper from the contemplated loading and unloading facilities will be Deseret Live
Stock Company. This is the practical view of the fact situation presented before the Commission.
In addition, there is the legal matter as to who is entitled to the use of the proposed facilities. The evidence
discloses that the only means of reaching these new far>iHt~ns
for shippers from the south is by use of the railroad crossing
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now used by Deseret in approaching or leaving the present
facilities. This crossing is not a public crossing. There is no
evidence before the Commission of any nature which we
are able to discover in the transcript which justifies the
conclusion that this crossing is available to the public generally. To the contrary, the evidence is that there is a gate
across the roadway approaching this crossing (and this gate
is plainly visible in the photographs introduced as exhibits)
which is locked as to the general public and is not available
as a means of crossing the railroad's right of way. Mr.
Palmer, a witness for the railroad, so testified (Tr. 501).
Mr. Dansie conceded that at least during a part of each year
the gate was locked (Tr. 666, 667). Certainly it cannot be
said that the evidence discloses that the present crossing
is a public crossing in light of this testimony and it is significant that nowhere in its report did the Commission find
that the present railroad crossing was a public crossing.
Such being the situation, we are unable to perceive how
it is possible to contend that as to shippers from the south
of the tracks there is any legal right to the use of the present
crossing. Consequently, it is difficult for us to see how it
fairly can be argued that the shippers from the south have
a right to use the proposed new stockyard facilities. As to
shippers from the north, the only legal basis upon which
those shippers could get their livestock to the stockyards is
by use of the 600 foot strip ordered made into a public
easement by the Public Service Commission of Utah in the
order complained of; but this affords no legal means by
which shippers from the north could arrive at the 600 foot
strip with their livestock. Such shippers would have to
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cross vast areas of Deseret Live Stock land if they desired
to approach from the north and there is no legal requirement
that the Deseret Live Stock Company furnish any such
approach shown by the evidence. If it be the thought of the
Commission that shippers from the north could arrive at
the crossing on the south side of the tracks by the use of
some public highway, then we respectfully urge that there
is no legal right of any such shippers to the use of the
crossing. Consequently, whether the situation be viewed
from a practical or from a legal standpoint, the proposed
facilities are private in nature.
Heretofore the Supreme Court of the State of Utah had
occasion to pass upon the public character of a utility service in the case of Garkane Power Co., Inc. v. Public Service
Commission, 98 Ut. 466, 100 P. (2) 571. In that case the
court was concerned with a determination as to whether
the Garkane Power Co., Inc., which was a nonprofit membership corporation, was a public utility and thus within
the control and regulation of the Public Service Commission
of Utah. In determining whether this company was a public utility the court quoted with approval from two other
cases as follows :
" 'The test * * * is * * * whether the
public has a legal right to the use which cannot be
gainsaid, or denied, or withdrawn, at the pleasure
of the owner.'" Farmers' Market Co. v. R. R. Co.,
142 Pa. 580, 21 A. 902, 989, 990.
" 'The essential feature of a public use is that
it is not confined to privileged individuals, but is
open to the indefinite public. It is this indefiniteness
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or unrestricted quality that gives it its public character.'" Thayer v. California Development Board,
164 Cal. 117, 127, 128 P. 21, 2:5.
Under this definition the facilities which are to be constructed, if the order of the Public Service Commission of
Utah is sustained, are not public in nature because there
will be no right in the public generally to secure admittance
to the same, and as has been heretofore said, if the matter
be viewed from a practical standpoint the conclusion is inescapable that the new stockyards are for the sole benefit
of Deseret Live Stock Company.
Title 49, Section 3, Subsection (1), United States Code
Annotated, as contained in the 1947 Cumulative Annual
Pocket Part, provides as follows :
"Sec. 3. Preferences ; interchange of traffic;
terminal facilities-Undue preferences or prejudices
prohibited
(1) It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the provisions of this chapter to make,
give, or cause any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person, company,
firm, corporation, association, locality, port, port
district, gateway, transit point, region, district, territory, or any particular description of traffic, in any
respect whatsoever; or to subject any particular person, company, firm, corporation, association, locality,
port, port district, gateway, transit point, region,
district, territory, or any particular description of
traffic to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or
disadvantage in any respect whatsoever; Provided,
however, That this paragraph shall not be construed
to apply to discrimination, prejudice, or disadvantage
to the traffic of any other carrier of whatever description."
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This paragraph of the Interstate Commeree Act thus clearly
prohibits a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce
by rail, as is the Union Pacific Railroad Company, from
giving unreasonable preference to any corporation including Deseret Live Stock Company.
The uncontradicted testimony before the Commission
given by the witness Pidcock for the railroad company is
to the following effect: In 1918 when the railroads were
under the control of the government an order known as
General Order 15 provided in effect that the railroad companies would build spur trackage facilities and other facilities of a similar character at their own expense to the clearance point and that from the clearance point the shipper
would be required to incur all other expense. Thereafter, of
course, the government relinquished control of the railroads
but in order to have a uniform policy, so that it might not be
said that preference or discrimination existed, the railroad
company has consistently followed said General Order 15.
In this manner uniformity of policy has been afforded to
all shippers over the Union Pacific Railroad Company. Certainly, if the railroad company promiscuously ignored the
policy of complying with General Order 15 by building spur
tracks for one shipper and refusing to build spur tracks or
facilities for another shipper, it could not fairly be said that
the railroad was supplying facilities to all and discrimination or preference as to none. Since the proposed stockyards
are off the right of way of the railroad company in the
instant case and therefore fall within the class of spur trackage and facilities which ordinarily would only be constructed
at the expense of the shipper, it is our contention that the
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order of the Public Service Commission of Utab requires
the Union Pacific Railroad Company to violate the provi.:
sions of the Interstate Commerce Act quoted above. We
concede that this contention must be based upon a conclusion that the proposed stock loading facilities are not public
in nature but are, in fact, of a private character for the
benefit of the Deseret Live Stock Company. This is true
because General Order 15 and the policy of the railroad
has never forbidden the railroad to pay the expense of truly
public facilities, whether within the clearance point or not.
The evidence with reference to the railroad's policy as created by General Order 15 is to be found at pages 548 to 569,
inclusive, of the Transcript, together with Exhibit 19 which
is a copy of what is known in the railroad world as General
Order 15.
It is our further contention, as shown by our assignment of error No. 3, that the Commission acted unlawfully
and arbitrarily in finding that the new facilities would be
public in nature. We have examined the transcript of all
the testimony carefully and we are able to find nothing to
support any such conclusion with the exception of the testimony of Mr. Dansie, which is found in the Transcript at
page 661 through 662. However, it is noted that Mr. Dansie
conceded the crossing gate was locked during a portion of
each year. He ventured as his opinion that it was locked
to keep the cattle from getting on the railroad but there is
no necessity for locking a gate to keep cattle from getting
through so long as the gate is properly fastened and we
would be interested in seeing any authority to support the
proposition that a crossing which may be kept locked durSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ing any substantial period of time each year is in fact a
public crossing available as a matter of right to the public
at all times.
The cases discussing unlawful preferences as given to
various shippers by railroad carriers are of course legion
in number. Suffice it to say that the following cases have
all held that the furnishing of additional facilities or services of a nature generally similar to the facilities in question in this case constituted unlawful preferences or discriminations in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act
quoted above:
United States v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co.,
266 U.S. 191, 45 Sup. Ct. 43, 69 L. Ed. 243;
Interstate Stockyards Co. v. Indianapolis Union
Ry. Co., 99 Fed. 472;
Sioux City Terminal Railway Switching, 241
I. C. C. 53; decided July 8, 1940;
Lehigh Valley Railroad Co. v. United Lead Co.,
133 A. 290.
Since the court's conclusion on this matter will have
to rest upon a determination as to whether the proposed
facilities are in fact public or whether they are private in
nature, we feel there is no use in belaboring the matter
further and we submit the contention for the court's determination.
THE CO:MMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN REQUIRING THE
RAILROAD COMPANY TO CONSTRUCT NEW FACILITIES IN THAT NO EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD JUSTIFIES THE MAGNITUDE OF THE PROGRAM REQUIRED
BY THE COMMISSION'S ORDER.
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The next portion of the argument which we submit
for the court's consideration is based upon assignments of
error Nos. 4 and 5 heretofore set forth. The basic premise
upon which we rely in submission of this phase of the brief
may simply be stated as follows: Even if it be determined
that the railroad failed to furnish adequate and reasonable
facilities at Wahsatch, Utah, nevertheless the jurisdiction
of the Commission is limited to a determination of the
minimum reasonabl~et requirements for adequacy of said
facilities and then an order based upon such finding requiring the construction of the same. In other words, we submit that inadequacy or unreasonableness of the present
facilities can never justify the Public Service Commission
in requiring the railroad to do more than to make the facilities reasonable and adequate and can never justify the Commission requiring the ultimate in perfection as to said
facilities. In the case of Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public Service Commission, et al., 105 Uta;h
230, 142 P. (2d) 873, this principle was clearly presented
to the court. In that case the Public Service Commission had
made a determination that the intrastate rates of the telephone company constituted discrimination against intrastate
telephone users as compared with the inteTstate rates then
in effect. It was also shown that the interstate rates had
been accepted by the telephone company as reasonable and
upon such facts the Public Service Commission ordered the
telephone company to cause its intrastate rates to be made
uniform with its interstate rates. When this matter was
presented to the Supreme Court of Utah Mr. Justice Wolfe,
speaking for the court, denied the authority of the Public
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Service Commission of Utah to so rule. It is clear that the
reason for the overruling of the Commission's decision in
that case was the failure of the Commission to take adequate
evidence as to the reasonability of the interstate rates when
applied to intrastate calls and to have made a fair determination as to whether or not said interstate rates were reasonable when applied to intrastate calls. The court pointed out
that upon a showing that the interstate rates had been
accepted as reasonable by the utility it then became incumbent upon the utility to explain any difference which it
might seek between the interstate rates and the intrastate
rates to be ordered by the Commission. However, the utility demonstrated by its evidence that there was a j ustification for some differential between interstate rates and
intrastate rates. The Supreme Court of this State pronounced the rule that in those circumstances the Commission's order fixing the intrastate rates at the same prices as
the interstate rates was therefore unlawful. We submit
that the same reasoning applies to the case at bar. Even
though this court be of the opinion that. the Public Service
Commission of Utah is correct in its finding that the present
facilities of the railroad at Wahsatch are inadequate, nevertheless, it is our contention that before the order of the
Commission requiring the construction of the loading facilities shown in Exhibit 10 can be sustained there must be sufficient evidence in the record made before the Commission,
together with a finding of the Commission, to justify the
conclusion that said proposed facilities constitute the minimum reasonable facilities at said location as distinguished
from the ultimate in facilities at Wahsatch. There is an
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absolute dearth of any evidence in the record to show that
the expenditure in excess of $20,000.00 to be required in
the construction of the proposed stockyards is the minimum ,
necessary to render the present facilities adequate.

1

•

The only reference which is made throughout the
Transcript to the facilities ordered constructed by the Commission is by railroad witnesses. The diagram offered in
evidence by the railroad was produced for the purpose of ;·, ·
showing that in order ~o comply with Mr. Dansie's requests ~:
a very substantial sum of money would have to be expended. 1 .
The evidence reveals that this diagram was prepared by
the Engineering Department of the railroad company upon
orders of the offici~s of the railroad when Mr. Dansie
requested additional facilities at Wahsatch. The evidence
shows that this diagram was made pursuant to the policy
of the railroad to ascertain the cost of the requested improvements and the general situation which would be encountered by the railroad in attempting to comply with the
shipper's request. Not one word of evidence from the rail- :
road's witnesses or others describes these facilities as the
minimum necessary to render the present facilities adequate.
As a matter of fact, there is not one word of evidence which
we are able to discover in the transcript dealing with the
requirements of the Deseret Live Stock Company or other
shippers from the north of the tracks in the way of railroad
facilities. It is true that the size of the shipments to be
made by the Deseret Live Stock and the nature thereof is
outlined in a general way by the testimony of Mr. Dansie
and others, but as to the requirements of the Deseret people
in the way of facilities no shred of evidence was produced.

1

1

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

89
If the law of Utah requires the Public Service Commission
to determine the reasonableness of the proposed facilities
from evidence, there can be no justification for the order
complained of in these proceedings. Certainly, such is and
must be the law of this State. In the first place, the provisions of 76-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, heretofore
referred to, require that the Commission conduct a hearing
before making an order such as the order made in this case.
There can be no purpose for such hearing except to entitle
the railroad or other utility to offer evidence as to the
adequacy or inadequacy of the existing facilities, and further, for the shipper to offer evidence as to what shall constitute reasonable, proper, and adequate facilities. This
section of our statutes also provides that the Commission
shall determine the just, reasonable, proper and adequate
equipment, facilities, appliances. and service.. Certainly in
view of such provision it must have been contemplated by
the legislature that the Commission base its determination
upon evidence to be offered at the hearing. The Supreme
Court of Utah required such action on the part of the Commission in the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company case referred to above.
It may be contended that a different rule applies under
76-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, than under the statute
in question in the telephone company case because the provisions of the statute in the telephone company case specifically provided that the Commission was required to make
a finding as to what would be just, reasonable and sufficient
rates (see 76-4-4 U. C. A. 1943); but the language used in
the two statutes is so nearly identical that no fair distinction
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

40

may be drawn. In 76-4-4 the statute provides that "the
Commission shall determine the just, reasonable or sufficient rates," and in 76-4-7 the statute provides that "the
Commission shall determine the just, reasonable, safe, ~:
proper, adequate or sufficient equipment, appliances, facilities or service." There being no valid distinction which ;~
we are able to perceive between the wording of these two
statutes we feel that the opinion of the Supreme Court of j
the State of Utah in the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Company case absolutely required of the Commission
in the instant case that it take evidence as to what would
be a reasonable improvement in the present facilities to
make them adequate. Such simply was not done at the time
of the hearing. The only place where the reasonability or
adequacy of the proposed facilities is even discussed lies
in the testimony of Mr. Terwilliger and in the testimony of
Mr. Pidcock, both witnesses for the railroad, and those
gentlemen were concerned with and testified concerning
the difficulties the new stockyards would present--not with
reference to their adequacy. In its report the Commission
makes the following statement in paragraph 10 thereof:
"Such a structure will cost an estimated $20,000.00, which
is a reasonable expenditure considering the convenience of
the public, economy of operation of the railroad, and convenience of shippers and amount of track at Wahsatch,
Utah."
To blandly state that an expenditure in excess of $20,000.00 will create a reasonable facility without exploring
in any manner the possibility of remedying any defect in
the facilities at a lesser price is so inherently unlawful as
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to appear almost ridiculous. For example, one of the
primary objections urged by the Deseret Live Stock people
as to the adequacy of the present facilities was the danger
presented by U. S. Highway 30 as it paralleled the tracks
of the railroad company. Common sense tells us that this
danger could be almost eliminated, if not entirely so, by
fencing between the railroad right of way and U. S. 30.
Complaint is also made as to the nature of the crossing but
no evidence was presented by the Deseret people, nor requested by the Commission, which shows that the crossing
could not be improved at a substantially less expensive price
than $20,000.00 so as to render the facilities now in existence absolutely reasonable to all shippers. Complaint was
made by the Deseret people that the engines and cars of
the railroad company frightened the stock which are shipped
to and from Wahsatch but there is no finding and no evidence which suggests that the proposed facilities will eliminate this danger and inconvenience or will even substantially improve the same. Mr. Dansie stated that there would
be improvement because the sheep or cattle could be confined in corrals rather than being at large as the locomotives
or trains proceeded in the vicinity; but it would still be
necessary to approach any new stockyards with the cattle
or sheep and there is no evidence in the record as to the
improvement in the stampeding damage which might be
expected by the construction of other and additional stockyards on the north side of the tracks. Certainly there is
no finding by the Commission as to any of these matters
other than as is quoted above.
In the case of Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Co. v.
Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., 80 Ut. 455, 15
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P. (2) 358, the Supreme Court of Utah had occasion to
pass upon a somewhat similar matter. In that case the
Public Utilities Commission of Utah had ordered that an
agency be maintained by the railroad company at St. John,
Utah to facilitate the business of shippers upon the grounds
that without said agency the facilities of the railroad were
not reasonable and adequate. At the time of the petition for
rehearing the railroad company offered to install a telephone at St. John, which would apparently obviate any
difficulty theretofore existing. Mr. Justice Wolfe, then a
District Court judge, sitting with the Supreme Court, and
speaking for the court, said in his opinion as follows:

·:-

·~

"There is nothing in the evidence adduced at
the hearing on the application for rehearing or the
other testimony (from) which the Commission could
conclude that the installation of this telephone together with all the other means available to the
shippers would not be reasonable and adequate service required by the statute. We cannot say that it
would or would not. That is not our province. It
may be that the installation of a telephone would
still leave the situation such that the shipper could
not obtain the reasonable and adequate service required by the statute. * * * We do not believe
that the Commission sufficiently explored the possibilities which the installation of a telephone would
accomplish."
'The court goes on to say in overruling the order of the
·Commission and remanding the same to the Commission
for further hearing :
"Whether the commissiOn makes an order requiring a service on insufficient evidence or whether
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it makes an order denying an application without
sufficient evidence to support the denial can make
no difference in principle."
Certainly this case may be said to stand for two propositions-(!), that it is improper and unlawful for the Commission to order the alteration of presently inadequate or
unreasonable facilities in such a manner as to cause large
expense when there is a more simple and cheaper method of
making the facilities reasonable and adequate, and (2), that
the Commission should explore the possibilities of cheaper
means of improving the facilities before requiring expenditures of large sums of money to create a facility in exact
accordance with the demands of the various shippers.
As applied to the case at bar, we submit that before
ordering the railroad company to build a stock loading
facility costing in excess of $20,000.00 at the whim of the
Deseret Live Stock Company, the Commission should have
taken evidence as to the minimum requirements of adequacy and reasonability at Wahsatch and should have explored the possibility of rendering the present facilities
adequate by other means than the contemplated stockyards.
Failure of the Commission to take such evidence should
render its decision unlawful; and failure of the Commission
to make a finding with reference to other possible solutions
to the problem which Deseret encounters in its shipping
makes it impossible for the Supreme Court to determine
whether or not the Commission was guided by such evidence as may be discovered in the record concerning the
necessity for additional stockyards on the north side of the
tracks at Wahsatch, Utah.
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THE COMMISSION ACTED ARBITRARILY AND ~t
UNLAWFULLY AND ERRED IN DENYING THE RAIL- }
ROAD COMPANY'S PETITION FOR REHEARING.
All of the matters discussed in the foregoing argument
with reference to this proceeding were properly raised before the Public Service Commission of Utah by the railroad
company's petition for rehearing, which was denied; consequently, if we be correct in any one of the arguments
which we have heretofore advanced as to any of the matters
therein discussed, the Commission acted unlawfully and
arbitrarily in denying said petition for rehearing. We
further contend that by its order requiring the construction of the stockyards and by its denial of the railroad
company's petition for rehearing, for the reasons hereinabove set forth, the Public Service Commission of Utah will
be depriving the petitioner in these proceedings of its property without due process of law, in violation of the XIV
Amendment of the Unit~d States Constitution and also of
the Constitution of the State of Utah, if the order made
by the Commission is affirmed.

•

CONCLUSION
In final summation of our position with reference to
this whole matter we paraphrase the statement of Mr.
Justice Folland in the case of Logan City v. Public Utilities
Commission of Utah, 77 Ut. 442, 296 P. 100. Mr. Justice
Folland's statement has nothing to do, legally speaking, with
the problem presented by these certiorari proceedings but
his language states more aptly than we may conceive ourSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

•
45

selves the principles which should be controlling in the
final determination of this case:
· ''The location and manner of placing stockyards
and stock loading facilities is essentially a matter of
business management of the railroad which should
not be interfered with by the Public Service Commission of Utah, unless it is made to appear that the
place chosen by the management for said stockyards
or stock loading facilities was chosen in bad faith
or involved gross inefficiency or presented an unreasonable choice. It is well settled that the Public
Service Commission of Utah cannot, under the guise
of regulating the reasonability and adequacy of the
facilities of a railroad, take into its hands the management of a railroad's property and thus interfere
with the rights of such management."
We respectfully urge the court to determine that the
order of the Public Service Commission of Utah, together
with its denial of the railroad company's petition for rehearing, is unlawful as in violation of the statutes of Utah,
the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution
of the State of Utah, and that said order be declared null
and void.
Respectfully submitted,
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